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Abstract. Many distributional conflicts are characterized by the presence of acquired
rights. The basic structure of these conflicts is that of the so-called claims problem, in
which an amount of money has to be divided among individuals with differing claims and
the total amount available falls short of the sum of the claims. We describe the results of
a questionnaire in which Belgian and German students were confronted with nine claims
problems. In the “Firm” version, respondents had to divide revenue among the owners
of a firm who contribute to the activities of the firm in different degrees. In the “Pen-
sions” version, they had to divide tax money among pensioners who have paid different
contributions during their active career. Responses in the Pensions version were more
egalitarian than in the Firm version. For both versions, the proportional rule performs
very well in describing the choices of the respondents. Other prominent rules—in par-
ticular the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules—fail to capture
some basic intuitions. A substantial part of the respondents tend to become more pro-
gressive as the amount to be distributed decreases other things equal, and tend to become
more progressive as the inequality in the distribution of claims becomes more unequal
other things equal. All of these conclusions are robust with respect to the difference in
home-country of the respondents.
Keywords. Claims problem · Acquired rights · Proportional rule · Constrained equal
awards rule · Constrained equal losses rule · Inequality
JEL classification. D63
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1 Introduction
Many distributional conflicts in the real world are characterized by the presence
of acquired rights. In some cases the legal system has worked out specific rules
about how to settle these conflicts: examples are to be found in the sphere of
bankruptcy or inheritance legislation. In other cases, however, there is no clear-
cut legal solution. Important recent examples of this situation are to be found in
the areas of social policy (how to cut social benefits if the budget turns out to be
too low to keep all promises?) and of wage policies within a firm (which form of
wage moderation is most acceptable when such moderation is made necessary by
economic circumstances?). Although the legal status of the acquired rights there-
fore may differ considerably in different situations, all the problems mentioned
before have the same basic theoretical structure. This structure can be described
as follows: how ought an amount of money to be distributed among a group of
individuals if these individuals have differing acquired rights, i.e., different prior
claims with respect to the money, and the amount available for distribution falls
short of the sum of these claims?
Psychological feelings of justice and injustice seem to be particularly strong
when acquired rights are at stake. Social reactions may then have a considerable
impact on the decisions taken and on their economic consequences. Of course, in
actual practice, distributional conflicts are settled within a set of well-structured
(legal, political, and social) institutions. Moreover, the economic agents involved
in the negotiations usually are driven by self-interest and influenced by specific
events and promises made in the past. These specific circumstances can only
be recovered by detailed empirical research. Yet at the same time, at a more
abstract level deeper ethical intuitions may also play a role. These may determine
whether specific distributional solutions are in the end acceptable to the parties.
They are certainly crucial for the agents that have to arbitrate in these conflicts
and that in general have no immediate self-interest in the distributional conflict.
It is therefore interesting to investigate the structure of these underlying ethical
intuitions.
There is by now a large and rapidly growing social choice literature on this
problem—referred to as the “claims problem,” the “bankruptcy problem,” or the
problem of “estate division.”1 In this theoretical literature, each claims problem
is completely defined by two characteristics, viz., the vector of claims and the
amount to be distributed. The literature then focuses to a large extent on the
axiomatic examination of rules, which associate with every claims problem a
division of the amount of money among the individuals. Many of the axioms
proposed in the literature have ethical content, which implies that the rules they
1For overviews of this literature, see Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003).
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characterize are open to interpersonal disagreement. The question thus arises to
what degree these various axioms (and therefore the various distribution rules) are
found attractive by empirical subjects in solving concrete claims problems. Ques-
tionnaire studies may give interesting insights into this question of the empirical
acceptance of various ethical theories.2 The results of these studies are not only
relevant from a normative point of view. Investigation of the acceptance of the
theoretical axioms may also offer a structured approach to explain why specific
decisions are taken in the real-world examples described before.
The theoretical literature makes abstraction from the particular economic con-
text in which the problem is situated. Knowledge of the basic characteristics of
the problem, i.e., the vector of claims and the amount to be distributed, is suffi-
cient to determine the solution. Unambigouous adherence to a rule implies that
it is consistently applied to all claims problems. This is a strong requirement, as
it might be possible that the acceptance of the ethical axioms is to some degree
dependent on the level of the respective claims or on the amount to be distributed.
Moreover, if rules are to be applied in practice, then the particular economic con-
text is likely to be important as well, as it influences the ethical status of the
characteristics of the claims problem. Therefore, from an empirical perspective,
the following two questions appear to be of importance. (i)Within-context consis-
tency: for a given economic context, to what degree do people use the same rule
for different claims problems, i.e., claims problems with different claims vectors
and/or available money amounts? (ii) Between-context uniformity: for a given
claims problem, to what degree do people propose the same division for different
economic contexts?
Previous questionnaire studies on claims problems—such as Schokkaert and
Overlaet (1989), Be´hue (2003), and Herrero, Moreno-Ternero, and Ponti (2006)
—have mainly focused on the question of between-context uniformity. The avail-
able results consistently show that the answers of respondents depend on the eco-
nomic context of the problem. Until now, within-context consistency has received
only modest attention. To analyse within-context consistency, one has to go fur-
ther than overall means and consider the complete choice patterns of individual
respondents over several claims problems.
In this paper, we deal with both the question of within-context consistency
and that of between-context uniformity. The former question is tackled by con-
sideration of a wide variety of claims problems, which are all presented to each
respondent, and by giving special attention to individual level data. The ques-
tion of between-context uniformity is dealt with by using two versions of the
questionnaire with the same claims problems—in the Firm version, three firm
2There is an increasing interest in economics in the empirical study of the acceptance of theo-
ries of distributive justice. See Konow (2003) and Schokkaert (1999) for recent overviews.
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owners have to distribute a loss, and in the Pensions version, a shortage in funds
has to be distributed over three pensioners. We tried to formulate socially rel-
evant problems, so that our results may contribute to understanding real-world
issues. Moreover, we tried to avoid situations in which there is a well-defined
legal solution to the distributional conflict, as this might have influenced strongly
the answers of the respondents. In the discussion of the results, we will focus
especially on the question of how respondents vary tolerance for inequality under
variations of the characteristics of the claims problem and of the economic con-
text. We organized the survey in two different countries, Belgium and Germany,
in both cases using student samples. A priori one would not expect large differ-
ences in the attitudes of Belgian and German students: our results therefore offer
a test of the robustness of the methodology.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present several rules and
introduce our conceptualization of tolerance for inequality. Section 3 discusses
the setup of our questionnaire. In Section 4, the results of the questionnaire are
presented and discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
A claims problem involves the division of an amount E ∈R+ among the individ-
uals in a set N = {1,2, . . . ,n} who have claims adding up to more than E. The
claims vector is a vector (c1,c2, . . . ,cn)∈Rn+ where, for all i∈N, ci denotes indi-
vidual i’s claim. Formally, a claims problem is an ordered pair (c,E) ∈ Rn+×R+
for which c1+ c2+ · · ·+ cn ≥ E. The set C collects all claims problems.
The literature on claims problems focuses on rules, which select for each
claims problem a division of the amount available between the individuals. For-
mally, a rule is a function R that associates with each (c,E) ∈ C an element of
Rn+, referred to as an awards vector, under the conditions R1(c,E)+R2(c,E)+
· · ·+Rn(c,E) = E, and 0≤ Ri(c,E)≤ ci for all i ∈ N. In line with the literature,
we accept these two conditions as part of the description of the problem. Note,
however, that they have real ethical content and are not necessarily innocuous
when analysing opinions.
One of the objectives in the discussion of our questionnaire results will be
to study how well various rules for solving claims problems explain the choices
of the respondents.3 The three most prominent rules are the proportional, con-
strained equal awards, and constrained equal losses rules.4
The proportional rule makes awards proportional to claims.
3For a thorough discussion of all the rules considered in this paper, see Thomson (2003).
4These rules are called the “three musketeers” by Herrero and Villar (2001).
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Proportional rule (P). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have P(c,E) = λc where λ solves
∑i∈N λci = E.
Note that if c1+ c2+ · · ·+ cn > 0, then each individual receives a proportion
E/(c1+ c2+ · · ·+ cn) of her claim.
The constrained equal awards rule equalizes awards under the constraint that
no individual receives an award that exceeds her claim.
Constrained equal awards rule (CEA). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we
have CEAi(c,E) =min{ci,λ} where λ solves ∑i∈Nmin{ci,λ}= E.
The constrained equal losses rule equalizes losses—an individual’s loss is
defined as the difference between her claim and award—under the constraint that
no individual receives a negative award.
Constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we have
CELi(c,E) =max{0,ci−λ} where λ solves ∑i∈Nmax{0,ci−λ}= E.
The five remaining rules considered in the discussion of the questionnaire re-
sults are: the Talmud (T), Piniles’ (Pin), constrained egalitarian (CE), random
arrival (RA), and minimal overlap (MO) rules. These rules are defined formally
in Appendix A. As an illustration of the differences between the eight rules in
solving concrete claims problems, see Tables 3 to 11, which present the solutions
proposed by the various rules for the nine claims problems used in our question-
naire.
In the literature several of these eight rules have been characterized in terms
of formal axioms. It is surprising, however, how little attention is paid to the
overall pattern of the ensuing distributions of awards. Yet the eight rules do im-
ply different attitudes to inequality, an aspect that may play an important role
in the opinions of lay observers. It certainly is crucial in discussions about ac-
quired rights in the real world. We shall pay special attention to this feature in
discussing our results. In order to make inequality comparisons, we define the
concept standardly used in the literature on inequality measurement, viz., the
Lorenz dominance relation.5 Let x,y ∈ Rn+ be two arbitrary vectors such that
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ·· · ≤ xn and y1 ≤ y2 ≤ ·· · ≤ yn. Then, x is said to Lorenz dominate y
if, for all k = 1,2, . . . ,n−1,
x1+ x2+ · · ·+ xk
x1+ x2+ · · ·+ xn ≥
y1+ y2+ · · ·+ yk
y1+ y2+ · · ·+ yn .
We say that x strictly Lorenz dominates y if, in addition, at least one of these
inequalities holds strictly. Of two awards vectors proposed for the same claims
5See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for recent overviews of this literature.
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problem, one is referred to as less unequal than the other if it Lorenz dominates
the other. The rule that proposes the less unequal awards vector, will be referred
to as more progressive for the given claims problem than the one that proposes
the more unequal awards vector. The general Lorenz dominance relationships
between the rules are described in Bosmans and Lauwers (2007).6
The three prominent rules constitute benchmark cases with respect to pro-
gressivity: they imply a uniform attitude in terms of progressivity irrespective
of the specific characteristics of the claims problem at hand. The proportional
rule is neutral with respect to progressivity in the sense that it chooses from the
available awards vectors the (only) one which is Lorenz equivalent to the claims
vector. The constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules both are
extreme cases. Roughly speaking, the former always selects the least unequal
awards vector available for any rule, while the latter always selects the most un-
equal one available for any rule.7
In contrast to the three prominent rules, the behaviour of the other five rules
with respect to progressivity is not so clear-cut. As the solutions of the various
rules for the claims problems in Tables 3 to 11 show, it is not the case that these
rules behave in the same way with regard to progressivity for all claims prob-
lems. For instance, Piniles’ rule and the constrained egalitarian rule propose the
constrained equal awards division for some claims problems and the proportional
division for others. The same is true for the Talmud, random arrival, and minimal
overlap rules, which, in addition, propose the constrained equal losses division
for certain claims problems.
3 The setup of the questionnaire
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to state their preferred awards vector
for nine different claims problems, which are presented in Table 1. Each of the
nine claims problems is a combination of one of three possible claims vectors and
one of three possible amounts to divide. The three possible claims vectors have
the same sum of claims, but differ in terms of inequality (in the Lorenz sense). We
mention the claims vectors in order of increasing inequality: (1500,2000,2500),
(1000,2000,3000), and (500,2000,3500). The three possible amounts to divide,
6See Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen (2001) and Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006) for re-
lated results.
7More precisely, the constrained equal awards rule always selects the least unequal awards
vector available for any rule satisfying order preservation of awards (for all (c,E) ∈ C and all
i, j ∈ N, if ci ≤ c j, then Ri(c,E)≤ R j(c,E)), while the latter always selects the most unequal one
available for any rule satisfying order preservation of awards and order preservation of losses (for
all (c,E) ∈ C and all i, j ∈ N, if ci ≤ c j, then ci−Ri(c,E) ≤ c j−R j(c,E)). This result is well
known in the literature. For a proof, see Bosmans and Lauwers (2007).
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Table 1. The questions, all amounts in euros
Question 1 c = (1500, 2000, 2500) E = 4500
Question 2 c = (1500, 2000, 2500) E = 3000
Question 3 c = (1500, 2000, 2500) E = 1500
Question 4 c = (1000, 2000, 3000) E = 4500
Question 5 c = (1000, 2000, 3000) E = 3000
Question 6 c = (1000, 2000, 3000) E = 1500
Question 7 c = (0500, 2000, 3500) E = 4500
Question 8 c = (0500, 2000, 3500) E = 3000
Question 9 c = (0500, 2000, 3500) E = 1500
4500, 3000, and 1500, are greater than, equal to, and smaller than the sum of the
half-claims, respectively.8 By using all nine combinations of these claims vectors
and amounts to divide in our questionnaire, we obtain data for a wide variety
of claims problems. The questionnaire design allows us to analyse the effect on
responses of a change in the amount to divide for a given claims vector (questions
1, 2, and 3; questions 4, 5, and 6; questions 7, 8, and 9), as well as the effect of
a change in claims inequality for a given amount to divide (questions 1, 4, and
7; questions 2, 5, and 8; questions 3, 6, and 9). For each of the nine questions,
respondents were presented with a list of alternative awards vectors to choose
from. These lists of awards vectors are given in Tables 3 to 11—we emphasize
that the information in the first two columns of these tables (pertaining to which
rules are consistent with each of the awards vectors) was not presented to the
respondents. To be able to examine within-context consistency, i.e., the degree
to which respondents use the same rule for different claims problems, the awards
vectors selected by each of the rules defined in the previous section are included
in the lists of alternatives for every question.
In order to allow us to tackle the question of between-context uniformity, i.e.,
the question of how the economic context in which the claims problems are pre-
sented affects responses, we consider two versions of the questionnaire with the
same nine claims problems, but with different background stories. Each respon-
dent gets only one version of the questionnaire. The questions in the “Firm”
version are formulated as follows (here we consider question 1):
Persons A, B, and C own a firm together. A, B, and C contribute to
the activities of the firm in different degrees, and for this reason they
have agreed that their salaries differ. They receive monthly e1,500,
e2,000, and e2,500, respectively. Each of the three persons has also
8As is made clear in Appendix A, the sum of the half-claims is an important benchmark in
the definition of the Talmud, Piniles’, and constrained egalitarian rules. It is also an important
benchmark in comparing the progressivity of the various rules (see Bosmans and Lauwers, 2007).
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other sources of income. Due to an unexpected deterioration of the
economic circumstances, the part of the revenue of the firm that can
be used for salaries in a certain month amounts to only e4,500, not
enough to compensate the three firm directors. What is in your view
the most just distribution of the sum of e4,500 among persons A, B,
and C?
In the “Pensions” version, the questions were formulated as follows (here we
again consider question 1):
Persons A, B, and C go on retirement. On the basis of the contribu-
tions they have paid during their active career, they are entitled to a
monthly pension of e1,500, e2,000, and e2,500, respectively. Due
to the demographic ageing, these pension amounts can no longer be
paid. The government only has e4,500 monthly to spend on the pen-
sions of A, B, and C. What is in your view the most just distribution
of the sum of e4,500 among persons A, B, and C?
The two versions of the questionnaire differ, explicitly or implicitly, in sev-
eral respects. First, the status of the differences between the claims of the three
individuals is different. In the Firm version, these differences are agreed upon
by the three firm owners, while in the Pensions version they are explained by
contributions in the past of the three pensioners and hence by wage differences
during the active career. Therefore, in the Firm version respondents are likely to
interpret the differences between claims to be caused more by desert and less by
talent than in the Pensions version. Second, the two versions of the questionnaire
differ with respect to the relation between the claims or awards and the ultimate
outcomes relevant to the three individuals. In the Firm version it is specified that
the individuals have also other sources of income. In the Pensions version on the
other hand, it is likely that respondents view the pension amounts as very impor-
tant, perhaps even the only, sources of income of the three individuals. Finally,
the scope of the decision is different in the two versions of the questionnaire.
Whereas in the Firm version awards pertain only to one monthly pay, in the Pen-
sions version payments are implied to be determined by the decision for much
longer.
Questions were presented in series of three: with the long introductions given
above for the first of the three questions and shorter introductions for the second
and third. After each series of three questions, respondents were encouraged to
provide written comments on their choices. The questionnaire was anonymous.
In order to test for order effects, we used several variants of the questionnaire with
different orders of the questions and different orders of the alternatives. There
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Table 2. Sample sizes
Belgium Germany All
Firm 123 153 276
Pensions 118 154 272
were no significant differences between these alternative variants, and we there-
fore pooled all the data.
The questionnaire was conducted among the first year undergraduate eco-
nomics and business students of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium,
in May 2005, and among graduate economics and business students of the Uni-
versity of Osnabru¨ck, Germany, in November 2005. None of the students had
already been exposed to the theory of claims problems in their study programs.
In the course of one week, the questionnaires were filled in by the students at the
start of several exercise sessions. In each session, roughly half of the students
participated in the Firm version of the questionnaire, and the other half in the
Pensions version. The sample sizes are given in Table 2.
4 Results
4.1 A first look
Tables 3 to 11 report the percentages of the respondents who chose each of the al-
ternative awards vectors in questions 1 to 9, respectively. Results are given for the
Belgian (B) and German (G) samples separately, as well as for the pooled sam-
ple (All). The awards vectors presented to the respondents appear in sequence of
increasing inequality (in the sense of the Lorenz criterion). Recall that the con-
strained equal awards rule always selects the least unequal awards vector, while
the constrained equal losses rule selects the most unequal one. For convenience
of exposition, we have distinguished three sets of alternatives in the tables. First,
the neutral awards vector is the one consistent with the proportional rule—it is
referred to as neutral because it is Lorenz equivalent to the claims vector. Sec-
ond, the awards vectors that Lorenz dominate the neutral solution are referred to
as egalitarian. Third, the anti-egalitarian awards vectors are the ones that are
Lorenz dominated by the neutral solution. The tables also report which rules are
consistent with each of the alternative awards vectors.
The results appear to be very similar for Belgium and Germany. The chi-
square tests in the first nine rows of Table 12 test for each question separately
the null hypothesis that the population proportions for the categories egalitarian,
neutral, and anti-egalitarian, respectively, are equal for Belgium and Germany.
The test in the last row does the same for the complete set of questions, i.e., for 27
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Table 3. Question 1, c= (1500,2000,2500) and E = 4500
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA, CE (1500, 1500, 1500) 04 05 04 04 02 03
Pin (1250, 1500, 1750) 12 14 13 21 16 18
Total 16 19 17 25 18 21
Neutr.: P (1125, 1500, 1875) 55 43 49 46 40 43
Anti-egal.: (1050, 1500, 1950) 02 02 02 07 05 06
CEL, T, RA, MO (1000, 1500, 2000) 27 34 31 22 34 29
Total 29 36 33 29 39 35
Table 4. Question 2, c= (1500,2000,2500) and E = 3000
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA (1000, 1000, 1000) 02 05 04 05 05 05
(850, 1000, 1150) 14 07 10 22 13 17
Total 16 12 14 27 18 22
Neutr.: P, T, CE, Pin, RA (750, 1000, 1250) 58 56 57 47 56 52
Anti-egal.: (650, 1000, 1350) 07 07 07 12 09 10
CEL, MO (500, 1000, 1500) 20 24 22 14 16 15
Total 27 31 29 26 25 25
Table 5. Question 3, c= (1500,2000,2500) and E = 1500
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA, T, CE, Pin, RA, MO (500, 500, 500) 09 05 07 11 16 14
(450, 500, 550) 09 09 09 24 14 18
Total 18 14 16 36 30 32
Neutr.: P (375, 500, 625) 59 50 54 44 42 43
Anti-egal.: (250, 500, 750) 21 27 24 16 24 20
CEL (0, 500, 1000) 03 07 05 03 03 03
Total 24 34 29 19 27 23
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Table 6. Question 4, c= (1000,2000,3000) and E = 4500
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA, CE (1000, 1750, 1750) 01 02 02 00 01 00
Pin (1000, 1500, 2000) 11 13 12 17 16 17
Total 12 15 14 17 17 17
Neutr.: P (750, 1500, 2250) 73 58 65 64 64 64
Anti-egal.: RA (666, 1416, 2416) 04 04 04 05 06 06
CEL, T, MO (500, 1500, 2500) 11 20 16 14 12 13
Total 15 24 20 19 18 19
Table 7. Question 5, c= (1000,2000,3000) and E = 3000
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA (1000, 1000, 1000) 02 01 01 03 03 03
(700, 1000, 1300) 14 10 12 24 19 21
Total 16 11 13 27 22 24
Neutr.: P, T, CE, Pin, RA (500, 1000, 1500) 73 72 73 61 69 66
Anti-egal.: MO (333, 833, 1833) 09 08 08 09 06 07
CEL (0, 1000, 2000) 02 06 04 03 01 02
Total 11 14 12 12 07 09
Table 8. Question 6, c= (1000,2000,3000) and E = 1500
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA, T, CE, Pin (500, 500, 500) 11 05 08 14 19 17
MO, RA (333, 583, 583) 04 02 03 17 09 12
Total 15 07 11 31 28 29
Neutr.: P (250, 500, 750) 70 70 70 58 53 55
Anti-egal.: (150, 500, 850) 12 14 13 08 11 09
CEL (0, 250, 1250) 03 05 04 02 02 02
Total 15 19 17 10 13 11
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Table 9. Question 7, c= (500,2000,3500) and E = 4500
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA, CE (500, 2000, 2000) 03 03 03 05 04 04
Pin (500, 1625, 2375) 10 07 08 18 25 22
(450, 1600, 2450) 02 04 03 12 10 11
(400, 1500, 2600) 12 11 11 13 09 10
Total 27 25 25 48 48 47
Neutr.: P (375, 1500, 2625) 48 47 48 34 29 31
Anti-egal.: RA (333, 1333, 2833) 03 06 05 07 06 06
T (250, 1375, 2875) 12 9 10 06 07 06
MO (166, 1416, 2916) 07 05 06 02 05 03
CEL (0, 1500, 3000) 04 05 04 02 03 02
Total 26 25 25 17 21 17
Table 10. Question 8, c= (500,2000,3500) and E = 3000
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA (500, 1250, 1250) 06 04 05 17 12 14
(350, 1100, 1550) 13 08 10 30 23 26
Total 19 12 15 47 35 40
Neutr.: P, T, CE, Pin, RA (250, 1000, 1750) 67 72 70 44 43 44
Anti-egal.: MO (166, 916, 1916) 09 07 08 04 07 06
CEL (0, 750, 2250) 03 05 04 02 01 02
Total 12 12 12 06 08 08
Table 11. Question 9, c= (500,2000,3500) and E = 1500
Firm Pensions
Rule(s) Awards vector B G All B G All
Egal.: CEA (500, 500, 500) 04 03 04 17 17 17
T, CE, Pin (250, 625, 625) 06 03 04 16 08 12
MO, RA (166, 666, 666) 05 00 02 03 03 03
Total 15 06 10 36 28 32
Neutr.: P (125, 500, 875) 62 64 63 46 42 43
Anti-egal.: (100, 450, 950) 09 12 11 06 09 07
(50, 450, 1000) 08 09 09 03 09 06
CEL (0, 0, 1500) 04 04 04 03 03 03
Total 21 25 24 12 21 16
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Table 12. Homogeneity of Belgian and German results, p-values for χ2 tests
Question Firm Pensions
1 0.187 0.116
2 0.463 0.150
3 0.113 0.407
4 0.064 0.981
5 0.464 0.267
6 0.148 0.637
7 0.995 0.609
8 0.294 0.432
9 0.061 0.076
All questions 0.350 0.726
Table 13. Homogeneity of firm and pensions versions, p-values for χ2 tests
Question Belgium Germany All
1 0.172 0.810 0.308
2 0.095 0.252 0.047
3 0.010 0.003 0.000
4 0.287 0.304 0.417
5 0.074 0.011 0.002
6 0.007 0.000 0.000
7 0.002 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000
All questions 0.000 0.000 0.000
(3×9) categories. The evidence clearly supports the null hypothesis. Therefore,
we will discuss the pooled data in this subsection. Given the small differences
in the characteristics of the Belgian and German samples, significant differences
between the results would have been rather worrying. The support for the null
hypothesis is a reassuring indication that our questionnaire method leads to robust
findings.
We first focus on the question of between-context uniformity, i.e., on the dif-
ferences between the results obtained with the two versions of the questionnaire.
Overall, the evidence suggests that responses are less egalitarian in the Firm ver-
sion than in the Pensions version. In all nine questions, the percentage of the
respondents that chose egalitarian awards vectors is lower in the Firm version
than in the Pensions version, and in eight out of nine questions the percentage
that chose anti-egalitarian awards vectors is higher in the Firm version than in the
Pensions version. The first nine rows of Table 13 test for each question separately
the null hypothesis that the population proportions for the categories egalitarian,
neutral, and anti-egalitarian, respectively, are equal for the two questionnaire ver-
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sions, and the last row does the same for the complete set of questions. Table
13 confirms that responses are significantly different for the two versions. The
evidence that respondents chose less egalitarian alternatives in the Firm version
than in the Pensions version is particularly strong in the case of questions 3, 6,
7, 8, and 9. Note that in each of these questions the majority of the alternative
award vectors feature incomes lower than e500, an amount close to the mini-
mally guaranteed income in Belgium and Germany. The fact that respondents in
the Pensions version are especially egalitarian in these cases, suggests that they
may have some concern for a minimum level of income being respected—in fact,
this concern was expressed explicitly by several respondents in the comments box
of the questionnaire. Put differently, for low awards, considerations with respect
to needs appear to override considerations with respect to claims. It is interesting
to note that the evidence suggests that the reason why respondents choose more
egalitarian alternatives in the Pensions version is not because they favour equality
in itself, but rather because they want to make sure individuals get a sufficient
amount of income. We will return to the interpretation of these results in a later
section.
The aggregate data given in Tables 3 to 11 is not suitable for examining
within-context consistency, i.e., for evaluating the degree to which rules are suc-
cessful in describing the choices of the respondents. It is inherent in the definition
of a rule that it proposes an awards vector for every claims problem. Hence, to
evaluate the acceptance of a given rule, we need to look at the entire response
patterns of individual respondents, not just at overall mean responses. However,
one first impression on the basis of the aggregate data is worth mentioning. The
awards vectors consistent with the proportional rule perform very well in explain-
ing responses: they are convincingly most popular in every question. Although
this is true for both versions of the questionnaire, it is even more outspoken in
the Firm version than in the Pensions version. Note that, both for the Firm ver-
sion and for the Pensions version, the proportional rule is especially popular in
questions 4, 5, and 6 where the claims vector is (1000,2000,3000). It is hard to
find an economic explanation for this observation—perhaps it is simply due to
the fact that, for the given claims vector, the awards vectors of the proportional
rule are particularly easy to calculate.
In the next subsection, we will provide a more robust analysis based on in-
dividual level data to compare the empirical performance of the various rules.
Before moving on, however, we discuss two basic intuitions of the respondents
that are revealed in the aggregate data for both versions of the questionnaire: con-
cerns for strict order preservation and nonzero awards. Both of these concerns
were also stated explicitly in comments by several respondents.
Respondents in both questionnaire versions seem to want the order in claims
to be preserved strictly in awards. Alternatives in which individuals with dif-
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Table 14. Percentages of consistency with rules
Firm Pensions
Rule B G All B G All
P 38 33 36 20 19 19
CEA 00 00 00 00 00 00
CEL 02 03 02 02 01 01
T 00 00 00 00 00 00
Pin 00 00 00 00 00 00
CE 00 00 00 00 00 00
RA 00 00 00 00 00 00
MO 00 00 00 00 00 00
ferent claims get the same award only appear in the sets of egalitarian awards
vectors of the questions. For all questions in which alternatives are available in
the set of egalitarian awards vectors that respect strict order preservation (this is
the case in all questions except 6 and 9), the awards vector that violates strict
order preservation is least popular among the egalitarian awards vectors for both
questionnaire versions. Since the constrained equal awards rule never respects
strict order preservation for the claims problems in our questionnaire, its awards
vectors perform rather badly in describing respondents’ choices.
There seems to be a reluctance among respondents in both questionnaire ver-
sions to give an individual a zero award. Awards vectors in which an individual
gets a zero award only appear as the least egalitarian alternative in the set of anti-
egalitarian awards vectors of the questions. In all questions in which such an
alternative is present (all questions except 1, 2, and 4), it is least popular among
the anti-egalitarian awards vectors for both versions of the questionnaire. This is
particularly relevant to explain the limited success of the constrained equal losses
rule, which always selects the awards vector with zero awards in these cases. At
the same time, in the questions in which the constrained equal losses rule gives
everyone strictly more than zero (questions 1, 2, and 4), its awards vectors are
most popular in the set of anti-egalitarian solutions.
4.2 A comparison of rules
Strictly speaking, a respondent is consistent with a rule only if she chooses the
awards vectors implied by the rule in all questions. Due to the relatively high
number of questions in the questionnaire, this test is rather demanding however.
Nevertheless, as Table 14 shows, substantial numbers of respondents were con-
sistent with the proportional rule in all nine questions for both questionnaire
versions. Given this good performance, it is not surprising that respondents often
mentioned in their comments that they were applying a proportional procedure
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Table 15. Percentages of lowest distances to award vectors of rules
Firm Pensions
Rule B G All B G All
Egalitarian: CEA 02 01 02 04 03 04
CE 01 01 01 00 00 00
Pin 06 05 05 23 16 19
Neutral or ambiguous: P 75 68 71 58 55 56
T 02 05 04 02 02 02
RA 06 12 09 05 20 14
MO 06 05 05 06 03 04
Anti-egalitarian: CEL 02 05 04 03 01 02
throughout the questionnaire. The only other rule that respondents have chosen
consistently with in all nine questions is the constrained equal losses rule: how-
ever, this is the case only for very low numbers of respondents in each of the two
versions of the questionnaire. Our finding concerning the dominating position of
the proportional rule is in line with the questionnaire results of Ga¨chter and Riedl
(2006) and Herrero, Moreno-Ternero, and Ponti (2006).
A less demanding method for comparing the performance of the various rules
in describing respondents’ choices can be obtained using the following concept
of “distance.” Let (c`,E`) be the claims problem used in question ` = 1,2, . . . ,9
and denote the awards vector chosen by respondent k in question ` by Ak(c`,E`).
We define the “distance” between the set of awards vectors chosen by k and the
set of awards vectors for rule R as ∑9`=1∑
3
i=1 |Aki (c`,E`)−Ri(c`,E`)|, i.e., as the
total money amount that respondent k deviates from what is prescribed by rule
R. The calculated distances can be used to compare the empirical performance of
the different rules: the lower the distance, the better the performance of the rule
in describing the choices of the given respondent.
Table 15 presents, for each rule, the percentages of the respondents for whom
the rule is ranked first, i.e., for whom the distance to the given rule is lower than
that to each other rule. The categories egalitarian, anti-egalitarian, and neutral
are defined similarly as in Tables 3 to 11. A rule is categorized as ambiguous
if it does not belong to any of the three other categories for all questions. For
the Firm version, the proportional rule clearly performs best. Of the other rules,
the random arrival rule stands out somewhat in the German sample, but not in
the Belgian sample. For the Pensions version, the proportional rule also comes
out first, but less overwhelmingly so: Piniles’ rule and, in the German sample,
the random arrival rule also perform well. It is remarkable that Piniles’ rule and
the random arrival rule outperform the prominent constrained equal awards and
constrained equal losses rules. As suggested before, this may be linked to the
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Table 16. Evolution of progressivity as the amount to divide decreases
Belgium
Same Decrease- Increase-
Quest. Context P CEA CEL Decrease Increase Increase Decrease
1, 2, 3 Firm 45 2 2 03 (0.998) 22 (0.000) 09 (0.923) 04 (1.000)
Pensions 29 2 2 09 (0.872) 26 (0.000) 06 (1.000) 03 (1.000)
4, 5, 6 Firm 55 0 2 08 (0.471) 16 (0.000) 02 (1.000) 07 (0.962)
Pensions 39 0 2 06 (0.978) 21 (0.000) 02 (1.000) 05 (1.000)
7, 8, 9 Firm 43 1 2 11 (0.106) 10 (0.179) 02 (1.000) 10 (0.952)
Pensions 25 3 2 07 (0.881) 15 (0.025) 04 (1.000) 11 (0.990)
Germany
Same Decrease- Increase-
Quest. Context P CEA CEL Decrease Increase Increase Decrease
1, 2, 3 Firm 37 2 4 07 (0.929) 25 (0.000) 5 (1.000) 07 (0.999)
Pensions 26 1 3 07 (0.996) 34 (0.000) 7 (1.000) 06 (1.000)
4, 5, 6 Firm 48 0 5 10 (0.289) 14 (0.012) 1 (1.000) 05 (1.000)
Pensions 36 0 1 08 (0.890) 24 (0.000) 3 (1.000) 07 (0.999)
7, 8, 9 Firm 40 0 3 17 (0.000) 11 (0.114) 2 (1.000) 09 (0.989)
Pensions 20 1 1 10 (0.546) 15 (0.047) 1 (1.000) 10 (1.000)
concern for strict order preservation and to the reluctance to award zero amounts.
Table 15 also confirms the conclusion with respect to the differences between the
two questionnaire versions that was stated in the previous subsection: egalitarian
rules do better in the Pensions version.
4.3 Variations in degree of egalitarianism
In the previous subsection, we studied the question of within-context consistency,
i.e., whether respondents use the same rule for each claims problem. Here, we
consider a similar question but in terms of progressivity. We examine whether
respondents take, for each claims problem, the same position with respect to pro-
gressivity, or whether they vary their position in a straightforward manner de-
pending on the characteristics of the claims problem at hand. Specifically, we
analyse whether there is a meaningful pattern to be found under two basic vari-
ations of the claims problem: (a) a decrease of the amount to divide while the
claims remain the same, and (b) an increase in the inequality of the claims vector
while the amount to divide remains the same.
In Table 16, the response patterns over the combinations of questions rele-
vant for question (a) are summarized (in percentages). The category same covers
the response patterns consistent with the proportional rule, the constrained equal
awards rule, or the constrained equal losses rule, i.e., the patterns in which the de-
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gree of progressivity remains unchanged. The other four categories—decrease,
increase, decrease-increase, and increase-decrease—describe simple variations
in progressivity, and are also defined using the three prominent rules as bench-
mark cases. To give an example: a response pattern over questions 1, 2, and 3
which is consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question 1, consis-
tent with the proportional rule in question 2 and consistent with the constrained
equal losses rule in question 3, would be categorized under decrease.9 A complete
description of the response patterns belonging to each of the categories is given
in Appendix B. The conclusions of this subsection are qualitatively the same for
the Belgian and German samples: because, as a consequence, the results for the
pooled sample do not provide additional insights, we do not give these in the
tables.
The category same performs best empirically, a result that can be ascribed
to the popularity of the proportional rule. It is more interesting to examine how
well the various other categories perform in describing the choices of those re-
spondents not consistent with the same category. Therefore, Table 16 provides p-
values for the null hypothesis that the population proportion for each of the given
categories is equal to what it would be if choices of respondents not consistent
with the same category were completely random.10 We find that, for both versions
of the questionnaire, the category increase, describing an increase in progressiv-
ity as the amount to divide decreases, performs well empirically, whereas all
other categories fail. The popularity of the increase category is consistent with
the observation made in Subsection 4.1 that respondents seem to attribute impor-
tance to minimal income needs. What is interesting is that this pattern appears to
be present not only for the Pensions version of the questionnaire, but also for the
Firm version, albeit in a somewhat weaker form.
Table 17 presents similar results as Table 16 but for question (b), i.e., for
an increase in the inequality of the claims vector while keeping the amount to
divide constant. As before, the same consistent patterns perform very well. The
question again arises how the other categories perform in describing the choices
9The reason why the Lorenz dominance relation was not used to define the categories, is
that this relation is not appropriate for making progressivity comparisons between awards vectors
proposed for different claims problems. To illustrate this point, suppose a respondent chooses
the awards vectors consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in both questions 4 and 5.
The Lorenz dominance relation would in that case say that the respondent is less progressive in
question 4 than in question 5, while it seems more natural to conclude instead that the respondent
takes the same position with respect to progressivity in the two questions, viz., the extremely
egalitarian one. The problem with the Lorenz dominance relation is that it does not take into
account the restrictions standardly imposed in the literature on claims problems—in the case of
the illustration, it fails to recognize that an individual should never receive an award greater than
her claim.
10The p-values are for the one sided exact test based on the binomial distribution.
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Table 17. Evolution of progressivity as claims inequality increases
Belgium
Same Decrease- Increase-
Quest. Context P CEA CEL Decrease Increase Increase Decrease
1, 4, 7 Firm 42 0 2 11 (0.242) 22 (0.000) 08 (0.988) 7 (0.998)
Pensions 21 0 2 08 (0.908) 34 (0.000) 13 (0.983) 3 (1.000)
2, 5, 8 Firm 49 2 2 03 (0.996) 17 (0.001) 02 (1.000) 7 (0.966)
Pensions 30 1 2 03 (1.000) 26 (0.000) 09 (0.994) 2 (1.000)
3, 6, 9 Firm 48 4 2 11 (0.106) 08 (0.414) 02 (1.000) 7 (0.957)
Pensions 34 8 2 05 (0.972) 18 (0.002) 05 (1.000) 3 (1.000)
Germany
Same Decrease- Increase-
Quest. Context P CEA CEL Decrease Increase Increase Decrease
1, 4, 7 Firm 35 01 4 04 (0.997) 26 (0.000) 06 (1.000) 7 (1.000)
Pensions 21 00 1 05 (0.998) 32 (0.000) 10 (0.999) 7 (1.000)
2, 5, 8 Firm 48 00 5 07 (0.856) 20 (0.000) 02 (1.000) 4 (1.000)
Pensions 30 01 1 03 (1.000) 25 (0.000) 07 (1.000) 6 (1.000)
3, 6, 9 Firm 42 02 4 09 (0.512) 11 (0.125) 03 (1.000) 9 (0.946)
Pensions 26 12 2 10 (0.428) 14 (0.037) 01 (1.000) 8 (0.996)
of the respondents who are not consistent with this category. The table shows
that, for both the Firm version and the Pensions version, the increase category,
describing an increase in progressivity as claims inequality increases, performs
very well empirically, whereas all other categories fail.11 A similar pattern was
found by Ga¨chter and Riedl (2006) on the basis of results for two questions. The
good performance of the increase category may again be seen as an indication
of the importance of minimal income needs: as claims inequality increases, the
claim of the individual with the lowest claim decreases, so that an increase in
progressivity is required in order to ensure a minimal amount for the individual
in question.
The pattern of increasing progressivity in the cases of decreasing amount to
divide or increasing claims inequality is striking. It seems worthwhile to work
out the theoretical consequences of this idea.
11Note that the increase category is less popular for the combination of questions 3, 6, and 9.
In the Pensions version, however, the popularity of the constrained equal awards rule (in the same
category) for this combination is remarkable. Since the constrained equal awards rule is the most
progressive rule possible, its good performance is to the disadvantage of the increase category.
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4.4 Acquired rights and cuts in earnings and pension benefits
It is of course impossible to draw strong policy conclusions from the answers
on highly stylized questions that abstract completely from possibly crucial insti-
tutional features. On the other hand, this abstract setting may make it possible
to discover deeper ethical intuitions. Let us therefore cautiously formulate some
general conclusions on real-world issues that we can draw from our questionnaire
results.
In the first place, our results confirm that feelings about being treated in a
fair way may play a crucial role in the psychological acceptability of different
distributions. One may indeed hypothesize that both the requirement that the
order in claims is preserved strictly in the awards and the requirement that no
individual should get a zero award, express deep psychological feelings about
a minimum level of respect for acquired rights. Note that in our setting these
concerns were expressed (implicitly) by observers that are not themselves directly
involved in the distributional conflict.
In the second place, the dominating position of the proportional rule is striking
and is certainly in line with everyday practice. It turns out, however, that the
popularity of more progressive rules increases if the distribution problem gets
more “difficult,” in that either the amount to divide decreases or the inequality in
the initial claims increases. In general, this suggests that an overall perspective on
inequality plays a role in the evaluation of different solutions. More particularly,
our findings may express a specific concern for the weakest groups, even in the
firm setting where the claims are closely linked to productive contributions and
have been agreed upon by the parties concerned.
In the third place, mainly in the pensions problem, we recover the popularity
of the idea of a “minimum floor” in the distribution. This idea is described by El-
ster (1992) as an integral part of the commonsense conception of justice. It came
also out strongly in the experiments of Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992). At the
same time, however, even in the pensions case responses were dominated by the
proportional rule. Our respondents overall do not express a strongly egalitarian
view on pensions. Perhaps we should not exaggerate the importance of this find-
ing. It may be caused by the general setting of the questionnaire, by which the
attention of the respondents was directed towards differences in contributions and
not, e.g., towards differences in needs. It may also be influenced by the fact that
both our samples come from countries with a traditionally Bismarckian type of
pension system, where benefits are indeed linked to contributions. More research
is needed to distinguish these different interpretations.12
12It could also be interesting to explore the links between the answers on stylized (“ethical”)
questions, such as the ones analysed in this paper, and the more institutionally rooted questions,
as exemplified in Boeri, Bo¨rsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2001, 2002).
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5 Conclusion
We discussed in this paper the results of a questionnaire study concerning claims
problems that was held among Belgian and German students. The results are re-
markably robust over the two samples. Two versions of the questionnaire were
considered—the Firm version and the Pensions version—in which the same
claims problems were presented in different economic contexts. The question-
naire setup allowed us to consider (i) the question of within-context consistency,
i.e., the degree to which respondents apply the same rule for different claims
problems in the same economic context, and (ii) the question of between-context
uniformity, i.e., the degree to which respondents propose the same awards vector
for the same claims problem in different economic contexts.
To start with the latter question: responses were clearly more egalitarian in
the Pensions version of the questionnaire than in the Firm version. We suggested
that this phenomenon could be due to the fact that the given context induced
respondents to give more weight to respect for basic needs in the choice of awards
vectors. The finding that the distributions chosen in different claims problems are
dependent on the economic context of the problem is not new. From a theoretical
point of view, it raises the difficult challenge of the construction of a kind of
meta-theory that would give a formal structure to the relationship between the
characteristics of the economic environment and the choice of a specific rule.
Considerations of personal responsibility and differential needs will certainly play
an important role here.
With regard to the question of within-context consistency, we found that the
proportional rule performed very well in describing the choices of the respondents
in both versions of the questionnaire. The other two rules that play a prominent
role in the literature, viz., the constrained equal awards and constrained equal
losses rules, fail to capture basic intuitions of the respondents. The constrained
equal awards rule in many cases gives equal awards to individuals with different
claims, whereas respondents seemed to prefer to respect these differences in the
choice of the awards vector. Respondents also appeared to be reluctant to give a
zero award to an individual with a nonzero claim, an intuition typically violated
by the constrained equal losses rule. Both intuitions are largely neglected in the
theoretical literature.13
We also considered the question of within-context consistency from the in-
equality perspective. The questionnaire design allowed us to examine variations
in the tolerance of inequality of the respondents under simple changes of the char-
acteristics of the claims problem. We found that, for those respondents who did
not adopt a uniform attitude towards inequality in all claims problems, response
13However, since recently the imposition of lower bounds on awards is studied. See, among
others, Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004) and Dominguez and Thomson (2006).
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patterns describing an increase in progressivity as the amount to divide decreases
other things equal and as inequality of the claims vector increases other things
equal performed well empirically. Here also, the questionnaire results suggest
interesting opportunities for further theoretical work. Indeed, while simple ideas
stated in terms of inequality are useful in organizing empirical intuitions con-
cerning claims problems, such ideas have remained largely unexamined in the
theoretical literature.
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Appendix A: Definitions of rules
In this appendix, we give formal definitions of the Talmud, Piniles’, constrained
egalitarian, random arrival, and minimal overlap rules.
The Talmud rule defines two regimes depending on whether the amount to
divide is smaller or greater than the sum of the half-claims. If the amount avail-
able is smaller, then the Talmud rule coincides with the constrained equal awards
rule applied to the vector of half-claims. If the amount available is greater than
the sum of the half-claims, then the Talmud rule gives each individual her half-
claim and uses the constrained equal losses rule to divide the remainder (with
both claims and amount to divide truncated).
Talmud rule (T). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12∑i∈N ci, then T (c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12∑i∈N ci, then T (c,E) = 12c+CEL(12c,E− 12∑i∈N ci).
Piniles’ rule and the constrained egalitarian rule coincide with the Talmud rule
in the case where the amount to divide is smaller than the sum of the half-claims.
Both rules use a more egalitarian procedure than the Talmud rule whenever the
amount to divide exceeds the sum of the half-claims.
Piniles’ rule (Pin). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12∑i∈N ci, then Pin(c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12∑i∈N ci, then Pin(c,E) = 12c+CEA(12c,E− 12∑i∈N ci).
Constrained egalitarian rule (CE). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12∑i∈N ci, then CE(c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12∑i∈N ci, then, for all i∈N, we haveCEi(c,E)=max{ ci2 ,min{ci,λ}}
where λ solves ∑i∈Nmax{ ci2 ,min{ci,λ}}= E.
To define the random arrival rule, assume the individuals arrive one at a time
and receive full compensations until the amount to divide runs out. The random
arrival rule proposes as a division the average over all orders of arrival of the
awards vectors obtained in this way. Let ΠN denote the class of all bijections that
map N onto itself.
Random arrival rule (RA). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we have
RAi(c,E) =
1
n! ∑pi∈ΠN
min
{
ci,max{E− ∑
j∈N,pi( j)<pi(i)
c j,0}
}
.
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To provide a definition of the minimal overlap rule, we assume, without loss
of generality, that the members of N are indexed such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ·· · ≤ cn. To
understand the rule, each individual i has to be seen as claiming the part [0,ci]
of the interval [0,E]. Two cases are distinguished. (i) In the case where there
is an individual with a claim at least as great as the amount to divide, first all
claims are truncated by the amount available. Then, each part of [0,E] is divided
equally among all individuals claiming it. For instance, the interval [0,c1] is
claimed by everyone, so everyone gets c1/n. The interval (c1,c2] is claimed by
everyone except individual 1, and so each member of N \{1} receives in addition
(c2− c1)/(n−1). This process continues until the entire interval [0,E] is covered.
(ii) In the case where there is no individual with a claim at least as great as the
amount to divide, one looks for a t ∈ R+ such that (ck− t)+ (ck+1− t)+ · · ·+
(cn− t) = E− t where ck is the smallest claim such that ck ≥ t. Each individual
i ∈ {k,k+ 1, . . . ,n} receives a share equal to (ci− t), i.e., the part of (t,E] that
i alone claims. The remaining part [0, t] is divided as in case (i) with t as the
amount to divide.
Minimal overlap rule (MO). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if ci ≥ E for some i ∈ N, then, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E}, we have
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1) ,
and, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j ≥ E}, we have
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ck−1− ck−2
n− (k−2) +
E− ck−1
n− (k−1) ,
where k =min{ j ∈ N | c j ≥ E}; and
(ii) if ci < E for all i ∈ N, then, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < t}, we have
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1) ,
and, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j ≥ t}, we have
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ck−1− ck−2
n− (k−2) +
t− ck−1
n− (k−1) + ci− t,
where t solves ∑i∈{ j∈N|c j≥t} (ci− t) = E− t and k =min{ j ∈ N | c j ≥ t}.
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Appendix B: Description of categories
Over two questions, the response patterns belonging to the categories same, de-
crease, and increase can be defined using the proportional rule, the constrained
equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses rule as benchmarks.
1. Same progressivity in question x and question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question x and in
question y.
(b) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and in question y.
(c) Consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question x and in
question y.
2. Decrease of progressivity from question x to question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question x and
less progressive than the constrained equal awards rule in question y.
(b) More progressive than the proportional rule in question x and at most
as progressive as the proportional rule in question y.
(c) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and less progres-
sive than the proportional rule in question y.
(d) Less progressive than the proportional rule but not consistent with the
constrained equal losses rule in question x and consistent with the
constrained equal losses rule in question y.
3. Increase of progressivity from question x to question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question x and
more progressive than the constrained equal losses rule in question y.
(b) Less progressive than the proportional rule in question x and at least
as progressive as the proportional rule in question y.
(c) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and more progres-
sive than the proportional rule in question y.
(d) More progressive than the proportional rule but not consistent with
the constrained equal awards rule in question x and consistent with
the constrained equal awards rule in question y.
Over three questions, the five categories same, decrease, increase, decrease-
increase, and increase-decrease are defined as follows.
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1. Same progressivity over questions x,y,z: Same in x and y and same in y and
z.
2. Decrease of progressivity over questions x,y,z:
(a) Decrease from x to y and decrease from y to z.
(b) Decrease from x to y and same from y to z.
(c) Same from x to y and decrease from y to z.
3. Increase of progressivity over questions x,y,z:
(a) Increase from x to y and increase from y to z.
(b) Increase from x to y and same from y to z.
(c) Same from x to y and increase from y to z.
4. Decrease-increase of progressivity over questions x,y,z: Decrease from x
to y and increase from y to z.
5. Increase-decrease of progressivity over questions x,y,z: Increase from x to
y and decrease from y to z.
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